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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The decision in the present case is in conformity with the well-settled
doctrine that a sovereign, while functioning governmentally, cannot sleep.
However, since a relatively large amount of interest had accrued; and since
interest on a judgment is generally considered to be a measure of damages
as distinguished from compensation for use of money,' 8 it appears grossly




During disbarment proceedings in the Circuit Court, an attorney's
license to practice was rescinded because he refused to reply to interrogations
by the presiding Judge as to whether he was presently, or had ever been,
a member of the Communist Party, on the ground that his answer might
tend to incriminate him. Held, reversed. Appellant's refusal to answer
being insufficient, without more, to sustain the Circuit Court's ruling, and
due process having been denied the attorney by the court's presumption
of his guilt. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
The precise question presented in the instant case had not been
adjudicated previously in Florida, nor in any of her forty-seven sister
states. While there are a number of grounds for disbarment, they are
often stated in broad general terms' which make them difficult to interpret.
The practice of law is generally considered a privilege,2 and the purpose
of disbarment has been held to be for the protection of the public and
the courts and not to punish the attorney. '  For this reason, it has been
held that disbarment is neither a prosecution, penalty, nor forfeiture.'
However, the Florida view is contra, the precedent for the court's decision
in the Sheiner case having been established in Florida State Board of
Architecture v. Seymour 5
18, Ibid.
1. E.g., misconduct rendering an attorney unfit to be entrusted with the powers
and duties of his office In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 324 (1934); conduct
showing such lack of good moral character as to render the attorney unworthy of
public confidence: Connecticut Grievance Comm. of Hartford County Bar v. Broder,
112 Conn. 263, 152 Atl. 292 (1930).
2. On the federal level: Application of Levy, 348 U.S. 887 (Tex. 1954); FEn,
SUP. CT. R., RULE 58; Conmmunist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.SC.A. §§ 841-844.
State cases: In re Anastoplo 3 I1l. 2d 471, 121 N.E. 2d 826 (1954); In re Clifton.
supra note 1.
3. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882); in re Mains, 121 Mich. 603, 80 N.W.
714, 716 (1899); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487.
4. In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 783 (N.Y. 1917).
5. 62 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla, 1952): "It is, accordingly, our view that a proceeding
to revoke appellee's certificate as an architect amounts to a prosecution to effect a
penalty or forfeiture as contemplated by Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, 1941,
F.S.A .. " in re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Ati 497 (1907) agrees with the
Florida view,
CASENOTES
Disbarment is ordinarily considered a judicial act,0 based upon due
inquiry into an attorney's fitness to practice. The character of the pro-
ceedings varies in different jurisdictions,7 but it is generally established that
the accused is entitled to a trial in accordance with legal rules and prin-
ciples.8  There is a difference of opinion, in state courts, as to the amount
of proof necessary to sustain the charges." The Supreme Court of the
United States puts the burden upon an attorney who is a member of its
bar to show cause, after being disbarred by a state, as to why he should
not be disbarred there. 10 Howcver, the rationale for this is the confidence
the High Court has in the bars maintained by the states."
In view of the fact that the general rule is that a fair hearing is
required, 12 it appears that the Supreme Court of Florida was not only
justified, but duty-bound to overrule the Circuit Court, inasmuch as the
lower court based its decision solely upon an inference of guilt of the
accused, and not upon a preponderance of the evidence. Regardless of
the guilt or innocence of the attorney a fair trial is a prerequisite for
disbarment.
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6. Toft v Ketchum 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671; In re Durant, supra note 5.
Contra, In re Anastoplo, supra note 2, holds that disbarment is an administrative,
rather than a judicial, proceeding.
7. Some courts regard disbarment proceedings as being criminal or at least quasi-
criminal in nature: Annotation: 95 Am.Dec. 335; others have said it is not a criminal
action: Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm., 266 S.W. 2d 818 (Ark. 1954); Gould v. State,
99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930); In re Burnette, 73 Kan. 609, 85 Pac. 575,
(1906); Ex parte Young, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 499, 284 App. Div. 406 (1954); still others
regard it as a civil proceeding: Toft v. Ketchum, supra note 6; or sui gcneris: Ex parte
Burr, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824); In re Sparrow, 338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W. 2d
401, 404 (1935).
8. People v. McCaskrin, 325 111. 149, 156 N.E. 328, 333 (1927): "The case
made by the record must not only be free from doubt as to the act charged, but
as to the motive with which it was done"; People v. Kerker, 315 Ill. 572, 146 N.E.
439 (1925): "Disbarment of an attorney is the death of his professional life. Regardless
of whether the misconduct charged amounts to a crime or merely to professional
misconduct, such charge must be proved by clear and convincing testimony"; In re
Rice, 167 Okl. 330, 29 P.2d 599 (1934); Norfolk and Portsmouth Bar Assn. v. Drewry,
161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934)(form is not controlling so long as the essentials
of a fair trial are present)
9. Courts which consider disbarment to be a criminal action require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt: Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1111; whereas in courts which hold it
to be a civil action, proof of guilt by a preponderance of the evidence is all that is
required: Furman v. State Bar of Calif., 12 Cal. 2d 212, 83 P.2d, 12 (1938); Gould v.
State, supra note 7; In re Mayberry, 3 N.E. 2d 248 (Mass. 1936); Annot., 105 A.L.R.
985, 987. But see State v. Maxwell, 19 Fla. 31 (1882) (the court has over attorneys
a jurisdiction which is to be exercised according to a standard of conscience and not
according to technical rules).
10. FED. SuP. CT. R. 2(5).
11 In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953). But disbarment is not automatic. The
Court does not follow the rule used in some state courts that disbarment in a sister
state is followed as a matter of comity.
12. Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
L w 250-51 (1951).
